The translation is temporarily closed for contributions due to maintenance, please come back later.
Key English Portuguese (Brazil) State
sponsorships->tari Tari Labs sponsors the CDN used by this website. Tari Labs patrocina o CDN utilizado neste website
press-kit->dontbuystickerp Spread Monero everywhere with the help of this sticker. Available in multiple languages and formats (vectors included). Spread Monero everywhere with the help of this sticker. Available in multiple languages and formats (vectors included).
press-kit->guerrillakit Guerrilla Toolkit Guerrilla Toolkit
press-kit->guerrillakitp A document created by the Monero Outreach workgroup containing materials and tips for an effective guerrilla marketing campaign. A document created by the Monero Outreach workgroup containing materials and tips for an effective guerrilla marketing campaign.
faq->acontribute2 Contact a Workgroup. Almost everything in Monero is managed by workgroups, which are groups of contributors (often lead by a coordinator) working on some specific aspect of the development. Some examples are: the localization workgroup (translations), the community workgroup, the GUI workgroup, the Outreach workgroup and so on. Workgroups are mostly independent and have their own structure. Contact the workgroup that interests you and ask how you can help. For a list of contacts see the Entre em contato com um Grupo de Trabalho. Quase tudo no Monero é gerenciado por grupos de trabalho, que são um conjunto de contribuidores (muitas vezes liderados por um coordenador) que trabalham em alguns aspectos específicos do desenvolvimento. Alguns exemplos: grupo de traduções (localization workgroup), grupo da comunidade (community workgroup), da carteira GUI (GUI workgroup), grupo de Outreach e por aí vai. A maioria destes grupos são independentes e possuem sua própria estrutura. Entre em contato com o grupo que mais lhe interessa e pergunte como você pode ajudar. Para uma lista de contatos veja a
mining->pools Pools Pools
developer-guides->daemonrpc Daemon RPC Daemon RPC
developer-guides->moneroecosystem Community of Monero developers. Contains libraries and resources and guides of some Monero Workgroups, like the Localization Workgroup and the Outreach Workgroup. Comunidade de desenvolvedores do Monero. Contém bibliotecas, recursos e guias de alguns grupos de trabalho do Monero, como o grupo de traduções (Localization Workgroup) e o Outreach (Outreach Workgroup).
roadmap->zeromq 0MQ/ZeroMQ 0MQ/ZeroMQ
roadmap->moneropedialoc Getmonero.org Moneropedia open for Localization Getmonero.org Moneropedia open for Localization
research-lab->mrl2 Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
research-lab->mrl3_abstract Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase. Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
research-lab->mrl4 Improving Obfuscation in the CryptoNote Protocol Improving Obfuscation in the CryptoNote Protocol
research-lab->mrl4_abstract We identify several blockchain analysis attacks available to degrade the untraceability of the CryptoNote 2.0 protocol. We analyze possible solutions, discuss the relative merits and drawbacks to those solutions, and recommend improvements to the Monero protocol that will hopefully provide long-term resistance of the cryptocurrency against blockchain analysis. Our recommended improvements to Monero include a protocol-level network-wide minimum mix-in policy of n = 2 foreign outputs per ring signature, a protocol-level increase of this value to n = 4 after two years, and a wallet-level default value of n = 4 in the interim. We also recommend a torrent-style method of sending Monero output. We also discuss a non-uniform, age-dependent mix-in selection method to mitigate the other forms of blockchain analysis identified herein, but we make no formal recommendations on implementation for a variety of reasons. The ramifications following these improvements are also discussed in some detail. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation. We identify several blockchain analysis attacks available to degrade the untraceability of the CryptoNote 2.0 protocol. We analyze possible solutions, discuss the relative merits and drawbacks to those solutions, and recommend improvements to the Monero protocol that will hopefully provide long-term resistance of the cryptocurrency against blockchain analysis. Our recommended improvements to Monero include a protocol-level network-wide minimum mix-in policy of n = 2 foreign outputs per ring signature, a protocol-level increase of this value to n = 4 after two years, and a wallet-level default value of n = 4 in the interim. We also recommend a torrent-style method of sending Monero output. We also discuss a non-uniform, age-dependent mix-in selection method to mitigate the other forms of blockchain analysis identified herein, but we make no formal recommendations on implementation for a variety of reasons. The ramifications following these improvements are also discussed in some detail. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
research-lab->mrl5 Ring Signature Confidential Transactions Ring Signature Confidential Transactions
research-lab->mrl5_abstract This article introduces a method of hiding transaction amounts in the strongly decentralized anonymous cryptocurrency Monero. Similar to Bitcoin, Monero is a cryptocurrency which is distributed through a proof of work “mining” process. The original Monero protocol was based on CryptoNote, which uses ring signatures and one-time keys to hide the destination and origin of transactions. Recently the technique of using a commitment scheme to hide the amount of a transaction has been discussed and implemented by Bitcoin Core Developer Gregory Maxwell. In this article, a new type of ring signature, A Multi-layered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature is described which allows for hidden amounts, origins and destinations of transactions with reasonable efficiency and verifiable, trustless coin generation. Some extensions of the protocol are provided, such as Aggregate Schnorr Range Proofs, and Ring Multisignature. The author would like to note that early drafts of this were publicized in the Monero Community and on the bitcoin research irc channel. Blockchain hashed drafts are available in [14] showing that this work was started in Summer 2015, and completed in early October 2015. An eprint is also available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098. This article introduces a method of hiding transaction amounts in the strongly decentralized anonymous cryptocurrency Monero. Similar to Bitcoin, Monero is a cryptocurrency which is distributed through a proof of work “mining” process. The original Monero protocol was based on CryptoNote, which uses ring signatures and one-time keys to hide the destination and origin of transactions. Recently the technique of using a commitment scheme to hide the amount of a transaction has been discussed and implemented by Bitcoin Core Developer Gregory Maxwell. In this article, a new type of ring signature, A Multi-layered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature is described which allows for hidden amounts, origins and destinations of transactions with reasonable efficiency and verifiable, trustless coin generation. Some extensions of the protocol are provided, such as Aggregate Schnorr Range Proofs, and Ring Multisignature. The author would like to note that early drafts of this were publicized in the Monero Community and on the bitcoin research irc channel. Blockchain hashed drafts are available in [14] showing that this work was started in Summer 2015, and completed in early October 2015. An eprint is also available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098.
research-lab->mrl6 An Efficient Implementation of Monero Subaddresses An Efficient Implementation of Monero Subaddresses
research-lab->mrl7 Sets of Spent Outputs Sets of Spent Outputs
research-lab->mrl7_abstract This technical note generalizes the concept of spend outputs using basic set theory. The definition captures a variety of earlier work on identifying such outputs. We quantify the effects of this analysis on the Monero blockchain and give a brief overview of mitigations. This technical note generalizes the concept of spend outputs using basic set theory. The definition captures a variety of earlier work on identifying such outputs. We quantify the effects of this analysis on the Monero blockchain and give a brief overview of mitigations.
research-lab->mrl8 Dual Linkable Ring Signatures Dual Linkable Ring Signatures