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Translation

research-lab->mrl4_abstract
English
We identify several blockchain analysis attacks available to degrade the untraceability of the CryptoNote 2.0 protocol. We analyze possible solutions, discuss the relative merits and drawbacks to those solutions, and recommend improvements to the Monero protocol that will hopefully provide long-term resistance of the cryptocurrency against blockchain analysis. Our recommended improvements to Monero include a protocol-level network-wide minimum mix-in policy of n = 2 foreign outputs per ring signature, a protocol-level increase of this value to n = 4 after two years, and a wallet-level default value of n = 4 in the interim. We also recommend a torrent-style method of sending Monero output. We also discuss a non-uniform, age-dependent mix-in selection method to mitigate the other forms of blockchain analysis identified herein, but we make no formal recommendations on implementation for a variety of reasons. The ramifications following these improvements are also discussed in some detail. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
1111/11110 · 1111
Key English Portuguese (Brazil) Actions
research-lab->mrl2
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
research-lab->mrl2_abstract
On 4 September 2014, an unusual and novel attack was executed against the Monero cryptocurrency network. This attack partitioned the network into two distinct subsets which refused to accept the legitimacy of the other subset. This had myriad effects, not all of which are yet known. The attacker had a short window of time during which a sort of counterfeiting could occur, for example. This research bulletin describes deficiencies in the CryptoNote reference code allowing for this attack, describes the solution initially put forth by Rafal Freeman from Tigusoft.pl and subsequently by the CryptoNote team, describes the current fix in the Monero code base, and elaborates upon exactly what the offending block did to the network. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
Em 4 de setembro de 2014, um ataque inusitado e inédito foi executado contra a rede da criptomoeda Monero. Este ataque dividiu a rede em dois subconjuntos distintos que se recusaram a aceitar a legitimidade do outro subconjunto. Isto teve inúmeros efeitos, nem todos são conhecidos ainda. O invasor teve uma pequena janela de tempo durante a qual uma espécie de falsificação poderia ocorrer, por exemplo. Este boletim de pesquisa descreve deficiências no código referência do CryptoNote permitindo este ataque, descreve a solução inicialmente apresentada por Rafal Freeman da Tigusoft.pl e posteriormente pela equipe do CryptoNote, descreve a correção atual na base de código Monero e elabora exatamente o que o bloco ofensor fez com a rede. Este boletim de pesquisa não foi submetido à revisão por pares e reflete apenas os resultados de uma investigação interna.
research-lab->mrl3
Monero is Not That Mysterious
Monero não é tão misterioso (em inglês)
research-lab->mrl3_abstract
Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
research-lab->mrl4
Improving Obfuscation in the CryptoNote Protocol
Improving Obfuscation in the CryptoNote Protocol
research-lab->mrl4_abstract
We identify several blockchain analysis attacks available to degrade the untraceability of the CryptoNote 2.0 protocol. We analyze possible solutions, discuss the relative merits and drawbacks to those solutions, and recommend improvements to the Monero protocol that will hopefully provide long-term resistance of the cryptocurrency against blockchain analysis. Our recommended improvements to Monero include a protocol-level network-wide minimum mix-in policy of n = 2 foreign outputs per ring signature, a protocol-level increase of this value to n = 4 after two years, and a wallet-level default value of n = 4 in the interim. We also recommend a torrent-style method of sending Monero output. We also discuss a non-uniform, age-dependent mix-in selection method to mitigate the other forms of blockchain analysis identified herein, but we make no formal recommendations on implementation for a variety of reasons. The ramifications following these improvements are also discussed in some detail. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
We identify several blockchain analysis attacks available to degrade the untraceability of the CryptoNote 2.0 protocol. We analyze possible solutions, discuss the relative merits and drawbacks to those solutions, and recommend improvements to the Monero protocol that will hopefully provide long-term resistance of the cryptocurrency against blockchain analysis. Our recommended improvements to Monero include a protocol-level network-wide minimum mix-in policy of n = 2 foreign outputs per ring signature, a protocol-level increase of this value to n = 4 after two years, and a wallet-level default value of n = 4 in the interim. We also recommend a torrent-style method of sending Monero output. We also discuss a non-uniform, age-dependent mix-in selection method to mitigate the other forms of blockchain analysis identified herein, but we make no formal recommendations on implementation for a variety of reasons. The ramifications following these improvements are also discussed in some detail. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
research-lab->mrl5
Ring Signature Confidential Transactions
Ring Signature Confidential Transactions
research-lab->mrl5_abstract
This article introduces a method of hiding transaction amounts in the strongly decentralized anonymous cryptocurrency Monero. Similar to Bitcoin, Monero is a cryptocurrency which is distributed through a proof of work “mining” process. The original Monero protocol was based on CryptoNote, which uses ring signatures and one-time keys to hide the destination and origin of transactions. Recently the technique of using a commitment scheme to hide the amount of a transaction has been discussed and implemented by Bitcoin Core Developer Gregory Maxwell. In this article, a new type of ring signature, A Multi-layered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature is described which allows for hidden amounts, origins and destinations of transactions with reasonable efficiency and verifiable, trustless coin generation. Some extensions of the protocol are provided, such as Aggregate Schnorr Range Proofs, and Ring Multisignature. The author would like to note that early drafts of this were publicized in the Monero Community and on the bitcoin research irc channel. Blockchain hashed drafts are available in [14] showing that this work was started in Summer 2015, and completed in early October 2015. An eprint is also available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098.
This article introduces a method of hiding transaction amounts in the strongly decentralized anonymous cryptocurrency Monero. Similar to Bitcoin, Monero is a cryptocurrency which is distributed through a proof of work “mining” process. The original Monero protocol was based on CryptoNote, which uses ring signatures and one-time keys to hide the destination and origin of transactions. Recently the technique of using a commitment scheme to hide the amount of a transaction has been discussed and implemented by Bitcoin Core Developer Gregory Maxwell. In this article, a new type of ring signature, A Multi-layered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature is described which allows for hidden amounts, origins and destinations of transactions with reasonable efficiency and verifiable, trustless coin generation. Some extensions of the protocol are provided, such as Aggregate Schnorr Range Proofs, and Ring Multisignature. The author would like to note that early drafts of this were publicized in the Monero Community and on the bitcoin research irc channel. Blockchain hashed drafts are available in [14] showing that this work was started in Summer 2015, and completed in early October 2015. An eprint is also available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098.
research-lab->mrl6
An Efficient Implementation of Monero Subaddresses
An Efficient Implementation of Monero Subaddresses
research-lab->mrl6_abstract
Users of the Monero cryptocurrency who wish to reuse wallet addresses in an unlinkable way must maintain separate wallets, which necessitates scanning incoming transactions for each one. We document a new address scheme that allows a user to maintain a single master wallet address and generate an arbitrary number of unlinkable subaddresses. Each transaction needs to be scanned only once to determine if it is destinated for any of the user’s subaddresses. The scheme additionally supports multiple outputs to other subaddresses, and is as efficient as traditional wallet transactions.
Usuários da criptomoeda Monero que desejam reutilizar endereços da carteira de forma não-rastreável devem manter carteiras separadas, sendo necessário o escaneamento de cada um em separado. Nós documentamos um novo esquema de endereços que permite ao usuário manter um endereço da carteira principal e gerar um número arbitrário de subendereços não-rastreáveis. Cada transação necessita ser verificada apenas uma vez para determinar se é destinada a algum subendereço do usuário. Além disso, o esquema suporta múltiplas saídas para outros subendereços e é tão eficiente quanto as transações da carteira principal.
research-lab->mrl7
Sets of Spent Outputs
Sets of Spent Outputs
Key English Portuguese (Brazil) Actions
research-lab->mrl2
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
research-lab->mrl2_abstract
On 4 September 2014, an unusual and novel attack was executed against the Monero cryptocurrency network. This attack partitioned the network into two distinct subsets which refused to accept the legitimacy of the other subset. This had myriad effects, not all of which are yet known. The attacker had a short window of time during which a sort of counterfeiting could occur, for example. This research bulletin describes deficiencies in the CryptoNote reference code allowing for this attack, describes the solution initially put forth by Rafal Freeman from Tigusoft.pl and subsequently by the CryptoNote team, describes the current fix in the Monero code base, and elaborates upon exactly what the offending block did to the network. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
Em 4 de setembro de 2014, um ataque inusitado e inédito foi executado contra a rede da criptomoeda Monero. Este ataque dividiu a rede em dois subconjuntos distintos que se recusaram a aceitar a legitimidade do outro subconjunto. Isto teve inúmeros efeitos, nem todos são conhecidos ainda. O invasor teve uma pequena janela de tempo durante a qual uma espécie de falsificação poderia ocorrer, por exemplo. Este boletim de pesquisa descreve deficiências no código referência do CryptoNote permitindo este ataque, descreve a solução inicialmente apresentada por Rafal Freeman da Tigusoft.pl e posteriormente pela equipe do CryptoNote, descreve a correção atual na base de código Monero e elabora exatamente o que o bloco ofensor fez com a rede. Este boletim de pesquisa não foi submetido à revisão por pares e reflete apenas os resultados de uma investigação interna.
research-lab->mrl3
Monero is Not That Mysterious
Monero não é tão misterioso (em inglês)
research-lab->mrl3_abstract
Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
research-lab->mrl4
Improving Obfuscation in the CryptoNote Protocol
Improving Obfuscation in the CryptoNote Protocol
research-lab->mrl4_abstract
We identify several blockchain analysis attacks available to degrade the untraceability of the CryptoNote 2.0 protocol. We analyze possible solutions, discuss the relative merits and drawbacks to those solutions, and recommend improvements to the Monero protocol that will hopefully provide long-term resistance of the cryptocurrency against blockchain analysis. Our recommended improvements to Monero include a protocol-level network-wide minimum mix-in policy of n = 2 foreign outputs per ring signature, a protocol-level increase of this value to n = 4 after two years, and a wallet-level default value of n = 4 in the interim. We also recommend a torrent-style method of sending Monero output. We also discuss a non-uniform, age-dependent mix-in selection method to mitigate the other forms of blockchain analysis identified herein, but we make no formal recommendations on implementation for a variety of reasons. The ramifications following these improvements are also discussed in some detail. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
We identify several blockchain analysis attacks available to degrade the untraceability of the CryptoNote 2.0 protocol. We analyze possible solutions, discuss the relative merits and drawbacks to those solutions, and recommend improvements to the Monero protocol that will hopefully provide long-term resistance of the cryptocurrency against blockchain analysis. Our recommended improvements to Monero include a protocol-level network-wide minimum mix-in policy of n = 2 foreign outputs per ring signature, a protocol-level increase of this value to n = 4 after two years, and a wallet-level default value of n = 4 in the interim. We also recommend a torrent-style method of sending Monero output. We also discuss a non-uniform, age-dependent mix-in selection method to mitigate the other forms of blockchain analysis identified herein, but we make no formal recommendations on implementation for a variety of reasons. The ramifications following these improvements are also discussed in some detail. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
research-lab->mrl5
Ring Signature Confidential Transactions
Ring Signature Confidential Transactions
research-lab->mrl5_abstract
This article introduces a method of hiding transaction amounts in the strongly decentralized anonymous cryptocurrency Monero. Similar to Bitcoin, Monero is a cryptocurrency which is distributed through a proof of work “mining” process. The original Monero protocol was based on CryptoNote, which uses ring signatures and one-time keys to hide the destination and origin of transactions. Recently the technique of using a commitment scheme to hide the amount of a transaction has been discussed and implemented by Bitcoin Core Developer Gregory Maxwell. In this article, a new type of ring signature, A Multi-layered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature is described which allows for hidden amounts, origins and destinations of transactions with reasonable efficiency and verifiable, trustless coin generation. Some extensions of the protocol are provided, such as Aggregate Schnorr Range Proofs, and Ring Multisignature. The author would like to note that early drafts of this were publicized in the Monero Community and on the bitcoin research irc channel. Blockchain hashed drafts are available in [14] showing that this work was started in Summer 2015, and completed in early October 2015. An eprint is also available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098.
This article introduces a method of hiding transaction amounts in the strongly decentralized anonymous cryptocurrency Monero. Similar to Bitcoin, Monero is a cryptocurrency which is distributed through a proof of work “mining” process. The original Monero protocol was based on CryptoNote, which uses ring signatures and one-time keys to hide the destination and origin of transactions. Recently the technique of using a commitment scheme to hide the amount of a transaction has been discussed and implemented by Bitcoin Core Developer Gregory Maxwell. In this article, a new type of ring signature, A Multi-layered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature is described which allows for hidden amounts, origins and destinations of transactions with reasonable efficiency and verifiable, trustless coin generation. Some extensions of the protocol are provided, such as Aggregate Schnorr Range Proofs, and Ring Multisignature. The author would like to note that early drafts of this were publicized in the Monero Community and on the bitcoin research irc channel. Blockchain hashed drafts are available in [14] showing that this work was started in Summer 2015, and completed in early October 2015. An eprint is also available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098.
research-lab->mrl6
An Efficient Implementation of Monero Subaddresses
An Efficient Implementation of Monero Subaddresses
research-lab->mrl6_abstract
Users of the Monero cryptocurrency who wish to reuse wallet addresses in an unlinkable way must maintain separate wallets, which necessitates scanning incoming transactions for each one. We document a new address scheme that allows a user to maintain a single master wallet address and generate an arbitrary number of unlinkable subaddresses. Each transaction needs to be scanned only once to determine if it is destinated for any of the user’s subaddresses. The scheme additionally supports multiple outputs to other subaddresses, and is as efficient as traditional wallet transactions.
Usuários da criptomoeda Monero que desejam reutilizar endereços da carteira de forma não-rastreável devem manter carteiras separadas, sendo necessário o escaneamento de cada um em separado. Nós documentamos um novo esquema de endereços que permite ao usuário manter um endereço da carteira principal e gerar um número arbitrário de subendereços não-rastreáveis. Cada transação necessita ser verificada apenas uma vez para determinar se é destinada a algum subendereço do usuário. Além disso, o esquema suporta múltiplas saídas para outros subendereços e é tão eficiente quanto as transações da carteira principal.

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English Portuguese (Brazil)
Blockchain Blockchain Monero CLI & GUI
Blockchain Blockchain Getmonero
Output Saída Monero CLI & GUI
Output Saída Getmonero
Wallet Carteira Monero CLI & GUI
Wallet Carteira Getmonero

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research-lab->mrl4_abstract
String age
4 years ago
Last updated
7 months ago
Source string age
4 years ago
Translation file
_i18n/pt-br.yml, string 762