Zen

Translation

research-lab->mrl1
English
A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
59/590 · 59
Key English Chinese (Traditional) Actions
research-lab->introduction
Introduction
前言
research-lab->read-paper
Read Paper
閱讀全文
research-lab->summary
Summary
總結
research-lab->mrlhtp
Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
research-lab->mrlhtp_summary
Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
research-lab->mrl1
A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
research-lab->mrl1_abstract
This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
research-lab->mrl2
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
research-lab->mrl2_abstract
On 4 September 2014, an unusual and novel attack was executed against the Monero cryptocurrency network. This attack partitioned the network into two distinct subsets which refused to accept the legitimacy of the other subset. This had myriad effects, not all of which are yet known. The attacker had a short window of time during which a sort of counterfeiting could occur, for example. This research bulletin describes deficiencies in the CryptoNote reference code allowing for this attack, describes the solution initially put forth by Rafal Freeman from Tigusoft.pl and subsequently by the CryptoNote team, describes the current fix in the Monero code base, and elaborates upon exactly what the offending block did to the network. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
On 4 September 2014, an unusual and novel attack was executed against the Monero cryptocurrency network. This attack partitioned the network into two distinct subsets which refused to accept the legitimacy of the other subset. This had myriad effects, not all of which are yet known. The attacker had a short window of time during which a sort of counterfeiting could occur, for example. This research bulletin describes deficiencies in the CryptoNote reference code allowing for this attack, describes the solution initially put forth by Rafal Freeman from Tigusoft.pl and subsequently by the CryptoNote team, describes the current fix in the Monero code base, and elaborates upon exactly what the offending block did to the network. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
research-lab->mrl3
Monero is Not That Mysterious
Monero is Not That Mysterious
research-lab->mrl3_abstract
Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
Key English Chinese (Traditional) Actions
research-lab->intro
Monero is not only committed to making a fungible currency, but also to continued research into the realm of financial privacy as it involves cryptocurrencies. Below you'll find the work of our very own Monero Research Lab, with more papers to come.
門羅幣不只是致力於打造一個滿足貨幣替代性的貨幣，更是持續研究著與加密貨幣相關的金融隱私。在以下你能看到一些來自門羅幣研究實驗室發表的研究論文，還有更多論文正在準備發表。
research-lab->introduction
Introduction
前言
research-lab->intro_email
To contact the Monero Research Lab, please email [email protected].
 
research-lab->librarybutton
Explore the Library
 
research-lab->libraryp
The library contains useful documents like 'Zero to Monero' and 'Mastering Monero', which explore and explain Monero in detail.
 
research-lab->mrl1
A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
research-lab->mrl10
Discrete Logarithm Equality Across Groups
Discrete Logarithm Equality Across Groups
research-lab->mrl10_abstract
This technical note describes an algorithm used to prove knowledge of the same discrete logarithm across different groups. The scheme expresses the common value as a scalar representation of bits, and uses a set of ring signatures to prove each bit is a valid value that is the same (up to an equivalence) across both scalar groups.
This technical note describes an algorithm used to prove knowledge of the same discrete logarithm across different groups. The scheme expresses the common value as a scalar representation of bits, and uses a set of ring signatures to prove each bit is a valid value that is the same (up to an equivalence) across both scalar groups.
research-lab->mrl1_abstract
This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
research-lab->mrl2
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol

Loading…

No matching activity found.
Browse all string changes

Things to check

Unchanged translation

Source and translation are identical

Reset

Glossary

English Chinese (Traditional)
No related strings found in the glossary.

String information

Key
research-lab->mrl1
String age
4 years ago
Last updated
7 months ago
Source string age
4 years ago
Translation file
_i18n/zh-tw.yml, string 755