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	Key	English	Actions
	research-lab->introduction	Introduction
	research-lab->read-paper	Read Paper
	research-lab->summary	Summary
	research-lab->mrlhtp	Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
	research-lab->mrlhtp_summary	Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
	research-lab->mrl1	A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
	research-lab->mrl1_abstract	This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
	research-lab->mrl2	Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
	research-lab->mrl2_abstract	On 4 September 2014, an unusual and novel attack was executed against the Monero cryptocurrency network. This attack partitioned the network into two distinct subsets which refused to accept the legitimacy of the other subset. This had myriad effects, not all of which are yet known. The attacker had a short window of time during which a sort of counterfeiting could occur, for example. This research bulletin describes deficiencies in the CryptoNote reference code allowing for this attack, describes the solution initially put forth by Rafal Freeman from Tigusoft.pl and subsequently by the CryptoNote team, describes the current fix in the Monero code base, and elaborates upon exactly what the offending block did to the network. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
	research-lab->mrl3	Monero is Not That Mysterious
	research-lab->mrl3_abstract	Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.

	Key	English	Actions
	research-lab->intro	Monero is not only committed to making a fungible currency, but also to continued research into the realm of financial privacy as it involves cryptocurrencies. Below you'll find the work of our very own Monero Research Lab, with more papers to come.
	research-lab->introduction	Introduction
	research-lab->intro_email	To contact the Monero Research Lab, please email [email protected].
	research-lab->librarybutton	Explore the Library
	research-lab->libraryp	The library contains useful documents like 'Zero to Monero' and 'Mastering Monero', which explore and explain Monero in detail.
	research-lab->mrl1	A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
	research-lab->mrl10	Discrete Logarithm Equality Across Groups
	research-lab->mrl10_abstract	This technical note describes an algorithm used to prove knowledge of the same discrete logarithm across different groups. The scheme expresses the common value as a scalar representation of bits, and uses a set of ring signatures to prove each bit is a valid value that is the same (up to an equivalence) across both scalar groups.
	research-lab->mrl1_abstract	This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
	research-lab->mrl2	Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol

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