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downloads->helpsupport1 A guide with an explanation of every section of the wallet is available: A guide with an explanation of every section of the wallet is available:
downloads->helpsupport2 See latest release See latest release
downloads->gui_helpsupport If you are experiencing issues or you need more info, feel free to reach out to the community. You can find the GUI team at #monero-gui, or else check out the Hangouts page for a more complete list of contacts and chatrooms If you are experiencing issues or you need more info, feel free to reach out to the community. You can find the GUI team at #monero-gui, or else check out the Hangouts page for a more complete list of contacts and chatrooms
downloads->cli_helpsupport If you are experiencing issues or you need more info, feel free to reach out to the community. You can find the CLI team at #monero or #monero-dev, or else check out the Hangouts page for a more complete list of contacts and chatrooms If you are experiencing issues or you need more info, feel free to reach out to the community. You can find the CLI team at #monero or #monero-dev, or else check out the Hangouts page for a more complete list of contacts and chatrooms
downloads->localremote1 Use your own copy of the blockchain or a publicly available one Use your own copy of the blockchain or a publicly available one
downloads->transacttor Transactions over Tor/I2P Transactions over Tor/I2P
downloads->mobilelight3 page to see where we are. page to see where we are.
press-kit->marketing Marketing Material Marketing Material
press-kit->dontbuysticker The 'Don't buy Monero' sticker The 'Don't buy Monero' sticker
press-kit->dontbuystickerp Spread Monero everywhere with the help of this sticker. Available in multiple languages and formats (vectors included). Spread Monero everywhere with the help of this sticker. Available in multiple languages and formats (vectors included).
press-kit->guerrillakit Guerrilla Toolkit Guerrilla Toolkit
press-kit->guerrillakitp A document created by the Monero Outreach workgroup containing materials and tips for an effective guerrilla marketing campaign. A document created by the Monero Outreach workgroup containing materials and tips for an effective guerrilla marketing campaign.
research-lab->summary Summary Summary
research-lab->mrlhtp Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
research-lab->mrlhtp_summary Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions. Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
research-lab->mrl1 A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0 A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
research-lab->mrl1_abstract This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation. This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
research-lab->mrl2 Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
research-lab->mrl2_abstract On 4 September 2014, an unusual and novel attack was executed against the Monero cryptocurrency network. This attack partitioned the network into two distinct subsets which refused to accept the legitimacy of the other subset. This had myriad effects, not all of which are yet known. The attacker had a short window of time during which a sort of counterfeiting could occur, for example. This research bulletin describes deficiencies in the CryptoNote reference code allowing for this attack, describes the solution initially put forth by Rafal Freeman from Tigusoft.pl and subsequently by the CryptoNote team, describes the current fix in the Monero code base, and elaborates upon exactly what the offending block did to the network. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation. On 4 September 2014, an unusual and novel attack was executed against the Monero cryptocurrency network. This attack partitioned the network into two distinct subsets which refused to accept the legitimacy of the other subset. This had myriad effects, not all of which are yet known. The attacker had a short window of time during which a sort of counterfeiting could occur, for example. This research bulletin describes deficiencies in the CryptoNote reference code allowing for this attack, describes the solution initially put forth by Rafal Freeman from Tigusoft.pl and subsequently by the CryptoNote team, describes the current fix in the Monero code base, and elaborates upon exactly what the offending block did to the network. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.