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research-lab->mrl1_abstract
English
This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
1077/10080 · 1008
Key English Portuguese (Brazil) Actions
research-lab->read-paper
Read Paper
Ler Artigo
research-lab->summary
Summary
Resumo
research-lab->mrlhtp
Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
Entendendo ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
research-lab->mrlhtp_summary
Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
Monero usa uma função hash única que transforma escalares em pontos de uma curva elíptica. É útil na criação de imagens-chave, por exemplo. Este documento, cujo autor é Shen Noether, traduz sua implementação (a função ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime()) em expressões matemáticas.
research-lab->mrl1
A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
Notas sobre o artigo Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
research-lab->mrl1_abstract
This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
Este boletim de pesquisa descreve um ataque plausível a um sistema de anonimato baseado em assinaturas em anel. Usamos ostensivamente como motivação o protocolo CryptoNote 2.0 publicado por Nicolas van Saberhagen em 2012. Foi previamente demonstrado que a não-rastreabilidade que obscurece um par de chaves de uma só vez pode ser dependente da não-rastreabilidade de todas as outras chaves utilizadas na composição dessa assinatura em anel. Isto permite a possibilidade de reações em cadeia na rastreabilidade entre assinaturas em anéis, causando uma perda crítica na não-rastreabilidade em toda a rede se os parâmetros forem mal escolhidos e se um invasor possuir uma porcentagem suficiente da rede. As assinaturas ainda são únicas, entretanto, e qualquer ataque desse tipo não necessariamente violará o anonimato dos usuários. Entretanto, tal ataque pode plausivelmente enfraquecer a resistência que o CryptoNote oferece contra análises de blockchain. Este boletim de pesquisa não foi submetido à revisão por pares, e reflete apenas os resultados de uma investigação interna.
research-lab->mrl2
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
research-lab->mrl2_abstract
On 4 September 2014, an unusual and novel attack was executed against the Monero cryptocurrency network. This attack partitioned the network into two distinct subsets which refused to accept the legitimacy of the other subset. This had myriad effects, not all of which are yet known. The attacker had a short window of time during which a sort of counterfeiting could occur, for example. This research bulletin describes deficiencies in the CryptoNote reference code allowing for this attack, describes the solution initially put forth by Rafal Freeman from Tigusoft.pl and subsequently by the CryptoNote team, describes the current fix in the Monero code base, and elaborates upon exactly what the offending block did to the network. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
Em 4 de setembro de 2014, um ataque inusitado e inédito foi executado contra a rede da criptomoeda Monero. Este ataque dividiu a rede em dois subconjuntos distintos que se recusaram a aceitar a legitimidade do outro subconjunto. Isto teve inúmeros efeitos, nem todos são conhecidos ainda. O invasor teve uma pequena janela de tempo durante a qual uma espécie de falsificação poderia ocorrer, por exemplo. Este boletim de pesquisa descreve deficiências no código referência do CryptoNote permitindo este ataque, descreve a solução inicialmente apresentada por Rafal Freeman da Tigusoft.pl e posteriormente pela equipe do CryptoNote, descreve a correção atual na base de código Monero e elabora exatamente o que o bloco ofensor fez com a rede. Este boletim de pesquisa não foi submetido à revisão por pares e reflete apenas os resultados de uma investigação interna.
research-lab->mrl3
Monero is Not That Mysterious
Monero não é tão misterioso (em inglês)
research-lab->mrl3_abstract
Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
research-lab->mrl4
Improving Obfuscation in the CryptoNote Protocol
Improving Obfuscation in the CryptoNote Protocol
Key English Portuguese (Brazil) Actions
research-lab->librarybutton
Explore the Library
 
research-lab->libraryp
The library contains useful documents like 'Zero to Monero' and 'Mastering Monero', which explore and explain Monero in detail.
 
research-lab->mrl1
A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
Notas sobre o artigo Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
research-lab->mrl10
Discrete Logarithm Equality Across Groups
Discrete Logarithm Equality Across Groups
research-lab->mrl10_abstract
This technical note describes an algorithm used to prove knowledge of the same discrete logarithm across different groups. The scheme expresses the common value as a scalar representation of bits, and uses a set of ring signatures to prove each bit is a valid value that is the same (up to an equivalence) across both scalar groups.
This technical note describes an algorithm used to prove knowledge of the same discrete logarithm across different groups. The scheme expresses the common value as a scalar representation of bits, and uses a set of ring signatures to prove each bit is a valid value that is the same (up to an equivalence) across both scalar groups.
research-lab->mrl1_abstract
This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
Este boletim de pesquisa descreve um ataque plausível a um sistema de anonimato baseado em assinaturas em anel. Usamos ostensivamente como motivação o protocolo CryptoNote 2.0 publicado por Nicolas van Saberhagen em 2012. Foi previamente demonstrado que a não-rastreabilidade que obscurece um par de chaves de uma só vez pode ser dependente da não-rastreabilidade de todas as outras chaves utilizadas na composição dessa assinatura em anel. Isto permite a possibilidade de reações em cadeia na rastreabilidade entre assinaturas em anéis, causando uma perda crítica na não-rastreabilidade em toda a rede se os parâmetros forem mal escolhidos e se um invasor possuir uma porcentagem suficiente da rede. As assinaturas ainda são únicas, entretanto, e qualquer ataque desse tipo não necessariamente violará o anonimato dos usuários. Entretanto, tal ataque pode plausivelmente enfraquecer a resistência que o CryptoNote oferece contra análises de blockchain. Este boletim de pesquisa não foi submetido à revisão por pares, e reflete apenas os resultados de uma investigação interna.
research-lab->mrl2
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
research-lab->mrl2_abstract
On 4 September 2014, an unusual and novel attack was executed against the Monero cryptocurrency network. This attack partitioned the network into two distinct subsets which refused to accept the legitimacy of the other subset. This had myriad effects, not all of which are yet known. The attacker had a short window of time during which a sort of counterfeiting could occur, for example. This research bulletin describes deficiencies in the CryptoNote reference code allowing for this attack, describes the solution initially put forth by Rafal Freeman from Tigusoft.pl and subsequently by the CryptoNote team, describes the current fix in the Monero code base, and elaborates upon exactly what the offending block did to the network. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
Em 4 de setembro de 2014, um ataque inusitado e inédito foi executado contra a rede da criptomoeda Monero. Este ataque dividiu a rede em dois subconjuntos distintos que se recusaram a aceitar a legitimidade do outro subconjunto. Isto teve inúmeros efeitos, nem todos são conhecidos ainda. O invasor teve uma pequena janela de tempo durante a qual uma espécie de falsificação poderia ocorrer, por exemplo. Este boletim de pesquisa descreve deficiências no código referência do CryptoNote permitindo este ataque, descreve a solução inicialmente apresentada por Rafal Freeman da Tigusoft.pl e posteriormente pela equipe do CryptoNote, descreve a correção atual na base de código Monero e elabora exatamente o que o bloco ofensor fez com a rede. Este boletim de pesquisa não foi submetido à revisão por pares e reflete apenas os resultados de uma investigação interna.
research-lab->mrl3
Monero is Not That Mysterious
Monero não é tão misterioso (em inglês)
research-lab->mrl3_abstract
Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.

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User avatar nelsonrenan

Suggestion accepted

Getmonero / monero-site — Portuguese (Brazil)

This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
This research bulEste boletinm describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency pesquisa descreve um ataque plausível a um sistema de anonimato baseado em assinaturas em anel. Usamos ostensivamente como motivação o protocolo CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published bypublicado por Nicolas van Saberhagen inem 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring Foi previamente demonstrado que a não-rastreabilidade que obscurece um par de chaves de uma só vez pode ser dependente da não-rastreabilidade de todas as outras chaves utilizadas na composição dessa assignature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring a em anel. Isto permite a possibilidade de reações em cadeia na rastreabilidade entre assignatures, causing as em anéis, causando uma perda criítical loss in untraceability across the whole network if na não-rastreabilidade em toda a rede se os paraâmeters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficientros forem mal escolhidos e se um invasor possuir uma peorcentage of the network. The m suficiente da rede. As assignatureas are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such aninda são únicas, entretanto, e qualquer ataque desse tipo não necessariamente violará o anonimato dos usuários. Entretanto, tal attack could plausibly weaken theque pode plausivelmente enfraquecer a resistaênceia que o CryptoNote demoferece constrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation análises de blockchain. Este boletim de pesquisa não foi submetido à revisão por pares, e reflete apenas os resultados de uma investigação interna.
3 years ago
User avatar netrik182

Suggestion added

Getmonero / monero-site — Portuguese (Brazil)

This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
Este boletim de pesquisa descreve um ataque plausível a um sistema de anonimato baseado em assinaturas em anel. Usamos ostensivamente como motivação o protocolo CryptoNote 2.0 publicado por Nicolas van Saberhagen em 2012. Foi previamente demonstrado que a não-rastreabilidade que obscurece um par de chaves de uma só vez pode ser dependente da não-rastreabilidade de todas as outras chaves utilizadas na composição dessa assinatura em anel. Isto permite a possibilidade de reações em cadeia na rastreabilidade entre assinaturas em anéis, causando uma perda crítica na não-rastreabilidade em toda a rede se os parâmetros forem mal escolhidos e se um invasor possuir uma porcentagem suficiente da rede. As assinaturas ainda são únicas, entretanto, e qualquer ataque desse tipo não necessariamente violará o anonimato dos usuários. Entretanto, tal ataque pode plausivelmente enfraquecer a resistência que o CryptoNote oferece contra análises de blockchain. Este boletim de pesquisa não foi submetido à revisão por pares, e reflete apenas os resultados de uma investigação interna.
4 years ago
Browse all string changes

Glossary

English Portuguese (Brazil)
Blockchain Blockchain Monero CLI & GUI
Blockchain Blockchain Getmonero
Ring signatures Assinaturas em anel Monero CLI & GUI
Ring signatures Assinaturas em anel Getmonero

String information

Key
research-lab->mrl1_abstract
String age
4 years ago
Last updated
8 months ago
Source string age
4 years ago
Translation file
_i18n/pt-br.yml, string 756